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Mark Twain wasn’t thinking about federalism or
the structure of American government when he
wrote “The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County.”1 Nonetheless, he would be amused
to know that today, almost 150 years later, the
Calaveras County Fair and Jumping Frog Jubilee
not only has a jumping-frog contest but also has
its own Frog Welfare Policy. The policy includes
a provision for the “Care of Sick or Injured Frogs”
and a limitation entitled “Frogs Not Permitted to
Participate,” which stipulates that “under no circumstances will a frog listed on the endangered
species list be permitted to participate in the
Frog Jump.”2 This fair, like medical practice, is
subject to both state and federal laws. Care of
the sick and injured (both frogs and people) is
primarily viewed as a matter of state law, whereas protection of endangered species is primarily
regulated by Congress under its authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Not to carry the analogy too far, but it is
worth recalling that Twain’s famous frog, Dan’l
Webster, lost his one and only jumping contest
because his stomach had been filled with quail
shot by a competitor. The loaded-down frog just
couldn’t jump. Until the California medicalmarijuana case, it seemed to many observers
that the conservative Rehnquist Court had succeeded in filling the commerce clause with quail
shot — and had effectively prevented the federal
government from regulating state activities. In
the medical-marijuana case, however, a new majority of justices took the lead out of the commerce clause so that the federal government
could legitimately claim jurisdiction over just
about any activity, including the practice of
medicine. The role of the commerce clause in
federalism and the implications of the Court’s
decision in the California medical-marijuana
case for physicians are the subjects I explore in
this article.
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the commer ce cl ause
The U.S. Constitution determines the areas over
which the federal government has authority. All
other areas remain, as they were before the
adoption of the Constitution, under the authority
of the individual states. Another way to say this
is that the states retain all governmental authority they did not delegate to the federal government, including areas such as criminal law and
family-law matters. These are part of the state’s
“police powers,” usually defined as the state’s
sovereign authority to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of its residents. Section 8 of Article
I of the Constitution contains 18 clauses specifying delegated areas (including the military, currency, postal service, and patenting) over which
“Congress shall have power,” and these include
the commerce clause — “to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.”
Until the Great Depression (and the disillusionment with unregulated markets), the Supreme Court took a narrow view of federal authority that could be derived from the commerce
clause by ruling consistently that it gave Congress the authority only to regulate activities
that directly involved the movement of commercial products (such as pharmaceuticals)
from one state to another. Since then, and at
least until 1995, the Court’s interpretation
seemed to be going in the opposite direction:
Congress was consistently held to have authority in areas that had almost any relationship at
all to commerce.

guns in scho ol s and violence
ag ains t women
Under modern commerce clause doctrine, Congress has authority to regulate in three broad
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categories of activities: the use of the channels
of interstate commerce (e.g., roads, air corridors,
and waterways); the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., trains, trucks, and planes)
and persons and things in interstate commerce;
and “activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce.”3 The first two categories
are easy ones in that they involve activities that
cross state lines. The third category, which does
not involve crossing a state line, is the controversial one. The interpretation question involves the
meaning and application of the concept of “substantially affecting” interstate commerce.
In a 1937 case that the Court characterized
as a “watershed case” it concluded that the real
question was one of the degree of effect. Intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions” are within the power of Congress to regulate.4 Later, in what has become perhaps its
best-known commerce-clause case, the Court
held that Congress could enforce a statute that
prohibited a farmer from growing wheat on his
own farm even if the wheat was never sold but
was used only for the farmer’s personal consumption. The Court concluded that although
one farmer’s personal use of homegrown wheat
may be trivial (and have no effect on commerce),
“taken together with that of many others similarly situated,” its effect on interstate commerce
(and the market price of wheat) “is far from
trivial.”5
The 1995 case that seemed to presage a
states’ rights revolution (often referred to as
“devolution”) involved the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime “for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone.”3 In a 5-to-4 opinion, written by
the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the
Court held that the statute exceeded Congress’s
authority under the commerce clause and only
the individual states had authority to criminalize the possession of guns in school.3
The federal government had argued (and the
four justices in the minority agreed) that the
costs of violent crime are spread out over the
entire population and that the presence of guns
in schools threatens “national productivity” by
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undermining the learning environment, which
in turn decreases learning and leads to a less
productive citizenry and thus a less productive
national economy. The majority of the Court rejected these arguments primarily because they
thought that accepting this line of reasoning
would make it impossible to define “any limitations on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign.”3
In 2000, in another 5-to-4 opinion written by
Rehnquist, using the same rationale, the Court
struck down a federal statute, part of the Violence against Women Act of 1994, that provided
a federal civil remedy for victims of “gendermotivated violence.” In the Court’s words:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity. . . . Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would
be able to regulate murder or any other
type of violence since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is
certain to have lesser economic impacts
than the larger class of which it is a part.6
The Court, specifically addressing the question of federalism, concluded that “the Constitution requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local. . . . Indeed, we can think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied to the
National Government and reposed in the States,
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”6

medic al marijuana in c alifornia
The next commerce-clause case involved physicians, albeit indirectly, and the role assigned to
them in California in relation to the protection
of patients who used physician-recommended
marijuana from criminal prosecution. The question before the Supreme Court in the recent
medical-marijuana case (Gonzalez v. Raich) was
this: Does the commerce clause give Congress
the authority to outlaw the local cultivation and
use of marijuana for medicine if such cultivation
and use complies with the provisions of California law?7
The California law, which is similar to laws
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in at least nine other states, creates an exemption from criminal prosecution for physicians,
patients, and primary caregivers who possess or
cultivate marijuana for medicinal purposes on
the recommendation of a physician. Two patients
for whom marijuana had been recommended
brought suit to challenge enforcement of the
federal Controlled Substances Act after federal
Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized
and destroyed all six marijuana plants that one
of them had been growing for her own medical
use in compliance with the California law. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, finding that the California law applied to a separate and distinct category of activity, “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation
and possession of cannabis for personal medical
purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law,” as
opposed to what it saw as the federal law’s purpose, which was to prevent “drug trafficking.”8
In a 6-to-3 opinion, written by Justice John Paul
Stevens, with Justice Rehnquist dissenting, the
Court reversed the appeals court’s opinion and
decided that Congress, under the commerce
clause, did have authority to enforce its prohibition against marijuana — even state-approved,
homegrown, noncommercial marijuana, used
only for medicinal purposes on a physician’s
recommendation.
The majority of the Court decided that the
commerce clause gave Congress the same power
to regulate homegrown marijuana for personal
use that it had to regulate homegrown wheat.6
The question was whether homegrown marijuana for personal medical consumption substantially affected interstate commerce (albeit illegal
commerce) when all affected patients were taken together. The Court concluded that Congress
“had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control” would affect “price and market conditions.”7 The Court also distinguished the gunsin-school and gender-violence cases on the basis
that regulation of drugs is “quintessentially economic” when economics is defined as the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”7
This left only one real question open: Is the
fact that marijuana is to be used only for medicinal purposes on the advice of a physician, as
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the Ninth Circuit Court had decided, sufficient
for an exception to be carved out of otherwise
legitimate federal authority to control drugs?
The Court decided it was not, for several reasons. The first was that Congress itself had determined that marijuana is a Schedule I drug,
which it defined as having “no acceptable medical use.” The Court acknowledged that Congress
might be wrong in this determination, but the
issue in this case was not whether marijuana
had possible legitimate medical uses but whether Congress had the authority to make the judgment that it had none and to ban all uses of the
drug. The dissenting justices argued that personal cultivation and use of marijuana should be
beyond the authority of the commerce clause.
The Court majority disagreed, stating that if it
accepted the dissenting justices’ argument, personal cultivation for recreational use would also
be beyond congressional authority. This conclusion, the majority argued, could not be sustained:
One need not have a degree in economics
to understand why a nationwide exemption
for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other
drugs) locally cultivated for personal use
(which presumably would include use by
friends, neighbors, and family members)
may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance. The congressional judgment
that an exemption for such a significant
segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire
[drug] regulatory scheme is entitled to a
strong presumption of validity.7
The other primary limit to the effect of the
California law on interstate commerce is the
requirement of a physician’s recommendation
on the basis of a medical determination that a
patient has an “illness for which marijuana
provides relief.” And the Court’s discussion of
this limit may be the most interesting, and disturbing, aspect of the case to physicians. Instead of concluding that physicians should be
free to use their best medical judgment and
that it was up to state medical boards to decide
whether specific physicians were failing to live
up to reasonable medical standards — as the
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Court did, for example, in its cases related to
restrictive abortion laws9 — the Court took a
totally different approach. In the Court’s words,
the broad language of the California medicalmarijuana law allows “even the most scrupulous doctor to conclude that some recreational
uses would be therapeutic. And our cases have
taught us that there are some unscrupulous
physicians who overprescribe when it is sufficiently profitable to do so.”7
The California law defines the category of
patients who are exempt from criminal prosecution as those suffering from cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma,
arthritis, migraine, and “any other chronic or
persistent medical symptom that substantially
limits the ability of a person to conduct one or
more major life activities . . . or if not alleviated may cause serious harm to the patient’s
safety or physical or mental health.” These
limits are hardly an invitation for recreationaluse recommendations.7 Regarding “unscrupulous physicians,” the Court cited two cases that
involve criminal prosecutions of physicians for
acting like drug dealers, one from 1919 and
the other from 1975, implying that because a
few physicians might have been criminally inclined in the past, it was reasonable for Congress (and the Court), on the basis of no actual
evidence, to assume that many physicians may
be so inclined today. It was not only physicians
that the Court found untrustworthy but sick
patients and their caregivers as well:
The exemption for cultivation by patients
and caregivers [patients can possess up to
8 oz of dried marijuana and cultivate up to
6 mature or 12 immature plants] can only
increase the supply of marijuana in the
California market. The likelihood that all
such production will promptly terminate
when patients recover or will precisely
match the patients’ medical needs during
their convalescence seems remote; whereas
the danger that excesses will satisfy some
of the admittedly enormous demand for
recreational use seems obvious.7
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent merits
comment, because it is especially relevant to the
practice of medicine. She argues that the Constitution requires the Court to protect “historic
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spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment” and that one of the virtues
of federalism is that it permits the individual
states to serve as “laboratories,” should they
wish, to try “novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
Specifically, she argues that the Court’s new
definition of economic activity is “breathtaking”
in its scope, creating exactly what the gun case
rejected — a federal police power. She also rejects reliance on the wheat case, noting that under the Agricultural Adjustment Act in question
in that case, Congress had exempted the planting of less than 200 bushels (about six tons),
and that when Roscoe Filburn, the farmer who
challenged the federal statute, himself harvested
his wheat, the statute exempted plantings of
less than six acres.5,7
In O’Connor’s words, the wheat case “did not
extend Commerce Clause authority to something as modest as the home cook’s herb garden.”8 O’Connor is not saying that Congress
cannot regulate small quantities of a product
produced for personal use, only that the wheat
case “did not hold or imply that small-scale production of commodities is always economic, and
automatically within Congress’ reach.” As to potential “exploitation [of the act] by unscrupulous
physicians” and patients, O’Connor finds no
factual support for this assertion and rejects the
conclusion that simply by “piling assertion upon
assertion” one can make a case for meeting the
“substantiality test” of the guns-in-school and
gender-violence cases.7
It is important to note that the Court was not
taking a position on whether Congress was correct to place marijuana in Schedule I or a position against California’s law, any more than it
was taking a position in favor of guns in schools
or violence against women in the earlier cases.
Instead, the Court was ruling only on the question of federal authority under the commerce
clause. The Court noted, for example, that California and its supporters may one day prevail by
pursuing the democratic process “in the halls of
Congress.”7 This seems extremely unlikely. More
important is the question not addressed in this
case — whether suffering patients have a substantive due-process claim to access to drugs
needed to prevent suffering or a valid medicalnecessity defense should they be prosecuted for
using medical marijuana on a physician’s rec-
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ommendation.10 Also not addressed was the
question that will be decided during the coming
year: whether Congress has delegated to the U.S.
attorney general its authority to decide what a
“legitimate medical use” of an approved drug is
in the context of Oregon’s law governing physician-assisted suicide.11,12 What is obvious from
this case, however, is that Congress has the authority, under the commerce clause, to regulate
both legal and illegal drugs whether or not the
drugs in question actually cross state lines. It
would also seem reasonable to conclude that
Congress has the authority to limit the uses of
approved drugs.

feder alism and endangered
specie s
Because Gonzales v. Raich is a drug case, and because it specifically involves marijuana, the
Court’s final word on federalism may not yet be
in. Whether the “states’ rights” movement has
any life left after medical marijuana may be determined in the context of the Endangered Species Act. Two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, for
example, have recently upheld application of the
federal law to protect endangered species that,
unlike the descendants of Mark Twain’s jumping
frog, have no commercial value. Even though the
Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from
both of the lower courts, the cases help us understand the contemporary reach of congressional power under the commerce clause. One case
involves the protection of six tiny creatures that
live in caves (the “Cave Species”) — three arthropods, a spider, and two beetles — from a commercial developer. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Cave Species are not
themselves an object of economics or commerce,
saying: “There is no market for them; any future
market is conjecture. If the speculative future
medicinal benefits from the Cave Species makes
their regulation commercial, then almost anything would be. . . . There is no historic trade
in the Cave Species, nor do tourists come to Texas to view them.”13 Nonetheless, the court concluded that Congress had the authority, under
the commerce clause, to view life as an “interdependent web” of all species; that destruction of
endangered species can be aggregated, like
homegrown wheat; and that the destruction of
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multiple species has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.13
The other case, from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, involves the arroyo southwestern toad, whose habitat was threatened by a
real-estate developer. In upholding the application of the Endangered Species Act to the case,
the appeals court held that the commercial activity being regulated was the housing development itself, as well as the “taking” of the toad
by the planned commercial development. The
court noted that the “company would like us to
consider its challenge to the ESA [Endangered
Species Act] only as applied to the arroyo toad,
which it says has no ‘known commercial value’
— unlike, for example, Mark Twain’s celebrated
jumping frogs [sic] of Calaveras County.”14 Instead, the court concluded that application of
the Endangered Species Act, far from eroding
states’ rights, is consistent with “the historic
power of the federal government to preserve
scarce resources in one locality for the future
benefit of all Americans.”14
On a request for a hearing by the entire appeals court, which was rejected, recently named
Chief Justice John Roberts — who at the time
was a member of the appeals court — wrote a
dissent that was not unlike Justice O’Connor’s
dissent in the marijuana case. In it he argued
that the court’s conclusion seemed inconsistent
with the guns-in-school and gender-violence
cases and that there were real problems with
using an analysis of the commerce clause to
regulate “the taking of a hapless toad that, for
reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California.”15 The case has since been settled. The
development is going ahead in a way that protects the toad’s habitat.16

the fu t ure of the commer ce
cl ause
Twain’s short story has been termed “a living
American fairy tale, acted out annually in Calaveras County.”1 In what might be termed a living
American government tale, nominees to the Supreme Court are routinely asked to explain their
judicial philosophy of constitutional and statutory interpretation to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Asked about his “hapless toad” opinion
during the Senate confirmation hearings on his
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nomination to replace Rehnquist as chief justice,
Roberts said: “The whole point of my argument
in the dissent was that there was another way to
look at this [i.e., the approach taken by the Fifth
Circuit Court in the Cave Species case]. . . . I
did not say that even in this case that the decision was wrong. . . . I simply said, let’s look at
those other grounds for decision because that
doesn’t present this problem.” These hearings
provide an opportunity for all Americans to review their understanding of our constitutional
government and the manner in which it allocates power between the federal government and
the 50 states. To the extent that this division of
power is determined by the Court’s view of the
commerce clause, a return to an expansive reading of this clause seems both likely and, given
the interdependence of the national and global
economies, proper.
Of course, the fact that Congress has authority over a particular subject — such as
whether to adopt a system of national licensure
for physicians — does not mean that its authority is unlimited or even that Congress will
use it. Rather, as Justice Stevens noted, cases
such as the California medical-marijuana case
lead to other central constitutional questions,
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as yet unresolved. These questions include
whether patients, terminally ill or not, have a
constitutional right not to suffer — at least,
when their physicians know how to control
their pain.12
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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